After Morales’s victory [in which he won a stunning 67% in the August referendum and the opposition lost two prefectures], “the only alternative left for Goldberg was to activate his ‘Plan B’”, aimed at plunging the country into violence, the document claims.
The aim was to either force a reaction from the military that would end with Morales’s resignation, or to justify a potential UN military intervention.
The document stated: “Following the strategy proposed by Goldberg, the prefects implemented a medium term plan to destabilise the government via destruction of public institutions, takeovers, and persistent provocations (including beatings) of the Police and the Army …”
Branco Marinkovic, a large landholder and head of the right-wing Santa Cruz Civic Committee traveled to the US on September 1, where he was convinced “that the [destabilisation] plan is in its final stages and that all stops must be pulled out”.
On his return eight days later, “a wave of violence was unleashed, with the burning of institutions and new acts of aggression against the Army and Police”.
It's important to remember that Evo was getting a lot of guff even from his own side for not acting forcefully enough against the medialuna. Crowds at the referendum victory party in Plaza Murillo, in central La Paz, were urging him to use a "strong hand" in dealing with rebel prefects and departments. Commerce was paralyzed for weeks due to road blocks, and it did look like Evo was twiddling his thumbs while Rome burned. But masterful tactician that he is, he let things play out while the opposition overextended itself--well, they actually slaughtered people in Pando. That, the international outcry over it, and Unasur's ascendancy and support of Evo then destroyed any credibility the oppos once had. Although the events were tragic, kudos to Morales for his patience and cunning in turning the tide of a U.S.-sponsored intervention. Pretty smart for a "dumb Indian," as my friends in Santa Cruz put it so succinctly.
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